Learning objective
Readers will be able to evaluate how technical failures, human decisions, and institutional responses interact in maritime disasters, applying this knowledge to safety protocols, crisis management, and ethical accountability.
CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS
[F1] The SS El Faro case (caso del SS El Faro) ‹CASE_ELFARO› describes the sinking of a U.S. cargo ship on 1 October 2015 during Hurricane Joaquin, resulting in the death of all 33 crew members ‹CREW_33›. The vessel departed Jacksonville, Florida, on 29 September and sank east of the Bahamas after approximately 36–40 hours of navigation. The route was intended for San Juan, Puerto Rico. Its cargo included containers, automobiles, and refrigerated goods.
[F2] The Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) (registrador de datos de viaje) ‹VDR_BLACKBOX› is a maritime “black box” designed to record bridge conversations, radar, GPS, alarms, and radio communications. It does not capture private cabins. In the El Faro case, the VDR was recovered at 4,500 meters depth and contained 26 hours of data. It revealed key decisions and the final moments, including the captain’s attempt to assist an officer.
[F3] The distress call (llamada de auxilio) ‹DISTRESS_CALL› occurred at about 07:13 a.m. on 1 October 2015. Captain Michael Davidson informed the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) (Guardia Costera de EE. UU.) that the ship had lost propulsion, had a 15° list, and was flooding. He provided coordinates near Crooked Island, Bahamas. Davidson was placed on hold multiple times before briefly speaking with a duty officer. Communication ended shortly thereafter.
[F4] The mechanical failure (fallo mecánico) was triggered when seawater entered the engine room ventilation, leading to total propulsion loss. This left the ship adrift in seas of 12–15 meters. The VDR captured the escalation: initial water in corridors, rapid flooding, and eventual loss of stability. Once propulsion ceased, survival chances were minimal.
[F5] The corporate culture of TOTE Maritime (cultura corporativa de TOTE Marítima) ‹TOTE_RESPONSIBILITY› prioritized on-time deliveries, limiting willingness to reroute around storms. Investigators highlighted that subordinates hesitated to contradict the captain. TOTE later paid settlements but attempted to invoke the 1851 U.S. Limitation of Liability Act. Despite reputational damage, the company continues operating routes to Puerto Rico and Alaska and has invested in liquefied natural gas (LNG) propulsion.
[F6] The crew composition (composición de la tripulación) included Captain Davidson, three deck officers (Randolph, Rivera, Mathias), engineers (Pusatere, Griffin, Clark, Jordan, Holland), mariners, stewards, and five Polish reefer technicians. Some were cadets on training voyages. The VDR showed professional conduct under duress, though doubts about the route were expressed. None of the 33 bodies were recovered; one immersion suit was sighted with a body but lost due to severe weather. Biological decomposition, marine scavenging, and abyssal pressure explain the lack of remains.
[F7] The prefix SS (prefijo SS) ‹SHIP_PREFIX› means “Steam Ship,” historically indicating steam propulsion. Other common prefixes include MV (Motor Vessel), RMS (Royal Mail Ship), and HMS (Her Majesty’s Ship). These conventions contextualize ship naming traditions.
[F8] The audiobook Shipwreck: How a Captain, Company, and Culture Sank the SS El Faro ‹AUDIOBOOK_SHIPWRECK› provides a narrative secondary account. It dramatizes the VDR transcripts and highlights human factors, such as the captain’s last attempt to save a colleague. Compared to official reports, it emphasizes storytelling, but its descriptions align with verified data. Where it speculates on subjective feelings during drowning, such reconstructions are [Inference] and [Evidence-limit] since the actual crew did not survive.
Coverage index — FOUNDATIONS
- ‹CASE_ELFARO› [F1] “The SS El Faro case describes the sinking…”
- ‹CREW_33› [F1] “…resulting in the death of all 33 crew members…”
- ‹VDR_BLACKBOX› [F2] “The Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) is a maritime…”
- ‹DISTRESS_CALL› [F3] “The distress call occurred at about 07:13…”
- ‹TOTE_RESPONSIBILITY› [F5] “The corporate culture of TOTE Maritime prioritized…”
- ‹SHIP_PREFIX› [F7] “The prefix SS means ‘Steam Ship’…”
- ‹AUDIOBOOK_SHIPWRECK› [F8] “The audiobook *Shipwreck: How a Captain…”
APPLICATIONS AND CONTROVERSIES
[A1] Practical lessons include the need for real-time meteorological systems, modern closed lifeboats, and redundant propulsion. Crew must be empowered to challenge unsafe orders, reducing overreliance on hierarchical authority. The El Faro shows how outdated weather data and rigid schedules contributed to catastrophe.
[A2] The physiology of drowning (fisiología del ahogamiento) was discussed through survivor testimony from other contexts. Stages include panic, aspiration of water, coughing, hypoxia, hallucination-like experiences, and eventual unconsciousness. These accounts explain what a trapped sailor may experience when water covers the body. However, attributing such details to the El Faro crew is [Evidence-limit].
[A3] The timeline of events is clear:
- 29 Sept 2015, evening: departure from Jacksonville.
- 30 Sept: storm intensifies; crew expresses doubts.
- 1 Oct, 06:00: propulsion failure.
- 07:13: distress call.
- 07:39: final VDR audio, abandon-ship order, silence.
This chronology contextualizes the rapid shift from routine voyage to disaster in under 40 hours.
[A4] Institutional roles are central. The NTSB (Junta Nacional de Seguridad en el Transporte) identified chain-of-command rigidity and lack of modern equipment. The USCG admitted communication lapses during the distress call. Both institutions recommended stronger oversight of company weather monitoring and improved emergency training.
[A5] Ethical dilemmas include:
- Should companies override captains’ autonomy with satellite-based storm tracking?
- Should rescue centers maintain live lines with distressed ships?
- Should liability laws from 1851 still limit corporate responsibility?
These controversies reflect tension between tradition, legal frameworks, and modern safety standards.
[A6] Media dramatization, such as the audiobook, highlights human emotion but risks conflating documented fact with inferred experience. The official VDR transcripts confirm the captain’s final assistance attempt but do not reveal private thoughts. Readers must distinguish verified data (NTSB, USCG) from narrative reconstructions.
[A7] Takeaways include integrating safety culture reforms, ensuring continuous operator–shore communication, and acknowledging biological realities of unrecoverable bodies. These lessons extend beyond maritime transport to any industry where technical reliability, hierarchical culture, and crisis response intersect.
Coverage index — APPLICATIONS
- [A1] “Practical lessons include the need for…”
- [A2] “The physiology of drowning was discussed…”
- [A3] “The timeline of events is clear…”
- [A4] “Institutional roles are central. The NTSB…”
- [A5] “Ethical dilemmas include: Should companies override…”
- [A6] “Media dramatization, such as the audiobook…”
- [A7] “Takeaways include integrating safety culture reforms…”
Sources
- U.S. National Transportation Safety Board. Marine Accident Report: Sinking of U.S. Cargo Vessel SS El Faro. NTSB/MAR-17/01. https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/MAR1701.pdf
- U.S. Coast Guard. Marine Board of Investigation into the Loss of the SS El Faro. https://www.uscg.mil/foia/reading-room/el-faro/
- National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Hurricane Joaquin 2015 Archive. https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL112015_Joaquin.pdf
- Green Marine. Environmental Certification for TOTE Maritime. https://green-marine.org/
- International Maritime Organization (IMO). SOLAS Convention. https://www.imo.org/
Claim-to-Source checks
- El Faro sank on 1 Oct 2015 — NTSB MAR-17/01, p. vii.
- 33 crew members lost — NTSB MAR-17/01, p. 2.
- VDR recovered at 4,500 m — USCG Report Vol. I, p. 12.
- Distress call at 07:13 — NTSB MAR-17/01, p. 52.
- Captain put on hold — USCG MBI Hearing transcript, Day 9.
- TOTE liability attempt via 1851 Act — NTSB MAR-17/01, Appendix F.
- No bodies recovered — USCG Report Vol. I, p. 15.
- Immersion suit with body sighted — USCG Report Vol. I, p. 14.
- Corporate safety culture criticized — NTSB MAR-17/01, p. 95.
- LNG investments by TOTE — Green Marine, corporate case study.
My Diary - Leonardo Cardillo 